In the span of a few weeks, the United States has signalled a new phase in global mineral diplomacy. On 30 April, Washington signed a landmark agreement with Ukraine, securing preferential access to its critical mineral resources while committing to the country’s post-war reconstruction. Simultaneously, the US is facilitating peace negotiations between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, where securing access to the DRC’s vast mineral reserves has emerged as a key strategic objective. These developments underscore how such resources are being reframed—not just as commodities, but as levers of influence in security, diplomacy, and industrial policy.
Rare earth elements (REEs), lithium, gallium, cobalt, and other minerals underpin the technologies that will define the coming decades—from clean energy and electric vehicles to semiconductors and defense systems. As major powers leverage supply chains and reconfigure industrial networks, control over these resources is becoming a central pillar of national security.
China built its mineral dominance through decades of foresight. The United States is responding with tariffs and alliances, while emerging powers like India are stepping in with strategic steps towards autonomy. The contours of today’s geoeconomics are increasingly being shaped underground.
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China’s rise as a mineral superpower
Until the late 20th century, the US was the world leader in rare earth production, riding on a wave of innovation and state-backed research. But as industrial priorities shifted and environmental regulations tightened, it gradually ceded that leadership to China.
In a conversation with me at Harvard University’s Technology and National Security Conference, Anthony Marchese, chairman of Texas Mineral Resources Corp, pointed to a key fork in the road: “The basis for the rare earth industry transitioning to China was in the 1990s when Magnequench, a subsidiary of General Motors that produced neodymium magnets, was sold to Chinese companies, and soon after was moved entirely into China.” That transfer wasn’t just of machinery, but of technological know-how, marking the beginning of an era of retreat for the US.
China, meanwhile, had begun executing a long-term strategy. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping distilled the strategy into a single line: “There is oil in the Middle East, there is rare earth in China.”
By 2023, China was able to build a global monopoly on REE production (70 per cent) and processing (90 per cent). Through state-led coordination and sustained investment in processing infrastructure, it rose from being a marginal player to a mineral superpower.
This dominance hasn’t gone unexercised. In 2010, amid a diplomatic standoff with Japan over the vessel collision incident near the disputed Senkaku Islands, Beijing abruptly halted rare earth exports to Japan. In the years since, China has repeatedly turned to minerals export controls as geopolitical leverage. It underscores a clear principle—in the era of clean technology and AI, mineral leverage is geopolitical leverage.
American pushback—tariffs and trade realignment
Recognising the United States’ near-total dependence on imports of critical minerals like graphite and gallium, President Donald Trump’s executive order in 2020 aimed to reduce vulnerabilities in these strategic supply chains. The Biden administration followed with sweeping export controls in 2022, targeting China’s access to advanced semiconductors and supercomputing capabilities central to its military and AI ambitions. Beijing retaliated with restrictions on gallium and germanium—minerals essential to US defence and electronics industries.
The confrontation escalated dramatically in 2025 under Trump 2.0, as China was hit with incremental tariffs of up to 145 per cent. In response, Beijing imposed retaliatory tariffs on US goods, suspended rare earth magnet exports, introduced licence requirements for key REEs, and added more American companies to its “unreliable entities” list.
Not long before this newest chapter of trade weaponisation, the US had already begun stitching together a counterweight through alliance-based economic statecraft. In early 2023, it signed an agreement with Japan to diversify and secure critical mineral supply chains, especially for electric vehicle batteries. That same year, the US also launched critical minerals negotiations with the European Union, which too has now set new targets for domestic mining and processing of critical raw materials.
As Washington looks to conclude more trade deals under Trump, its Free Trade Agreement with the United Kingdom, signed last week, eliminates the 25 per cent tariff on British aluminium, which is also designated as critical under US policy. These agreements reflect more than just bilateral alignment—they are blueprints for an emerging minerals architecture aimed at countering China’s dominance in these supply chains.
India’s third path on minerals
As the US-China rivalry deepens, countries like India are attempting to chart a third path, which is less adversarial and more strategic.
This year, India launched its National Critical Mineral Mission, backed by a combined public funding and investment commitment of approximately $4 billion. Its engagement in global mineral diplomacy includes a 2024 agreement with Argentina to explore five lithium blocks, which marks a key entry into Latin America’s resource economy. At home, India is promoting AI-powered exploration through initiatives like the IndiaAI Hackathon on Mineral Targeting.
India’s approach exemplifies how emerging powers are moving beyond dependency models. By participating in multilateral platforms like the US-led Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), India and others like South Korea, aim to shape the emerging rules of engagement in mineral value chains, emphasising sustainability, innovation, and equitable access.
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A new map of strategic autonomy
Critical minerals now sit at the centre of a broader recalibration in global power dynamics. What’s clear is that materials science, once a technical backwater, is fast becoming a geopolitical frontier. As Anthony Marchese notes, if materials are to compete with code, “they need to offer the same magnetic pull as Silicon Valley”—not just in capital, but in talent as well. The coming era will demand not only access to resources, but also the skilled ecosystems to transform them.
The evolving minerals order raises urgent questions. Will today’s tariff wars give way to a new rulebook for resource governance? Can strategic alliances outpace unilateralism in reshaping the supply chains of the future? The answers may not be set in stone, but the race to shape what lies beneath is already well underway.
Ritwija Darbari is a Mason Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School. She has worked in global trade and investment policy for over a decade through her roles with the United Nations, World Economic Forum, and government agencies of India and Switzerland. Views are personal.
(Edited by Asavari Singh)