Since the extraordinary public argument between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office at the end of February, European leaders have sought to send the message that they have finally faced up to reality and are willing to take difficult decisions. They have promised to dramatically increase defence spending and vowed to continue supporting Ukraine even as the US threatens to withdraw its support.
“Europe has to be able to protect itself, to defend itself, as we have to put Ukraine in a position to defend itself and to push for a last and just peace,” said the European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, after an emergency summit on 6 March. The Danish prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, said Europeans need to “spend, spend, spend on defence and deterrence” and “continue to support Ukraine because we want peace in Europe”.
Yet even now, European leaders are in denial about the situation. As the statements by Von der Leyen and Frederiksen illustrate, they still seem unable to differentiate between the defence of Ukraine and their own security. They imagine they are in a position to continue supporting Ukraine – and even replace the US – while keeping the fragile American security guarantee to Europe in place. They still think they can have it all.
The kind of peace deal Donald Trump wants is clear. The US will offer Ukraine no security guarantees except for the presence of American contractors extracting rare earth minerals. If Europeans want to offer additional security guarantees of their own – for example, what is now being called a European “reassurance” force led by France and the UK – that is up to them. But Trump will not provide the “backstop” that Keir Starmer said he wanted.
This puts Europeans in an extremely difficult position which foreign policy analysts, who for the past three years have mostly said what must happen rather than carefully analysing what will happen, are apparently still not really thinking through. There are two likely scenarios, depending on whether a peace deal in Ukraine actually materialises – and both would jeopardise Nato and the US security guarantee to Europe.
Since the Oval Office meeting, Zelensky has backtracked and seems willing to accept Trump’s minerals deal. He also said he wants peace. Many foreign policy analysts are sceptical that Vladimir Putin will agree to a deal, though Trump seems confident that he will. Even if Putin does want to end the war, he may refuse to accept the presence of European troops in Ukraine. Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, has repeatedly said his country is opposed to this.
If Putin was to agree, European leaders would have to decide whether they really want to go ahead and put “boots on the ground” in Ukraine without US backing. If they do, they would be putting themselves in an extremely dangerous position. If the Russians were to kill some British troops and Trump did not agree to invoke Nato’s Article 5 – which declares that an attack on one member is viewed as an attack on all members – that would in effect be the end of the alliance. And, moreover, the European countries involved would either have to back down or declare war on Russia.
On the other hand, if Ukraine does not accept Trump’s deal or if negotiations break down, and Ukraine keeps fighting, the US will likely go even further in withdrawing military support. In this scenario, Europeans would again be in an extremely difficult position which would endanger their own security, though in a slightly different way.
So far, European leaders insist they will continue to provide military support to Ukraine whatever the US does. It ishard to see how they can replace America – Ukraine was losing the war even with US support. In other words, it would be futile for Europeans to try to do so. But the real danger for them is that they would be diverging from the US position, and Trump would likely punish them in much the same way he is already punishing Ukraine.
Europeans are right to seek to quickly increase defence spending, though it is a bit late – and it would be politically disastrous to cut welfare spending in order to raise defence spending, not least for a centre-left leader such as Starmer. But though Trump wants Europe to increase its outlay on defence, he does not want it to help Ukraine keep fighting while he seeks to bring the war to an end.
Either way – and this is the reality that few seem willing to face – Europeans risk undermining their own security in order to defend Ukraine. In particular, they will be jeopardising the US security guarantee without having any alternative to it, at least in the short term. On 5 March, the French president, Emmanuel Macron, said he would be open to discussing the idea of extending France’s nuclear deterrent to the rest of the EU. But this would involve extremely complicated negotiations, if it is feasible at all, and could not happen quickly.
Given this lack of a realistic alternative to American military power, are Europeans really prepared to risk abandonment by the US? That is, the end of the security guarantee to Nato, backed by its nuclear deterrent? If European leaders truly believe that Russia is a threat not just to Ukraine but also to Nato countries, as they have claimed for the past three years, why would they do that?
[See also: Why Britain isn’t working]
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This article appears in the 12 Mar 2025 issue of the New Statesman, Why Britain isn’t working